Constitutionalising Local Government: Why One of England’s Most Important Democratic Debates Is Only Just Beginning
In the latest episode of The Truth About Local Government, Matthew Masters sits down with Professor Jonathan Davies to explore a question that sits at the heart of power, democracy and governance in England: should local government be constitutionally recognised and protected? Drawing on his recent paper, Constitutionalising Local Government, Davies argues that while devolution has become a defining feature of modern government policy, the constitutional foundations needed to make it durable remain surprisingly weak.
At first glance, constitutional reform may appear to be a debate reserved for academics, lawyers and governance specialists. Yet the issue has profound implications for every council, every community and every public service in England. It raises fundamental questions about who makes decisions, where power should sit, and whether local government can ever become genuinely autonomous within one of the most centralised democratic systems in the world.
Unlike many comparable democracies, local government in England enjoys no meaningful constitutional protection. Councils exist because Parliament allows them to exist. Their powers, structures, boundaries and responsibilities can be reorganised, merged, abolished or substantially altered through ordinary legislation. This creates a striking contradiction. Successive governments have increasingly championed devolution, local growth and place-based leadership, yet the legal relationship between Whitehall and local government continues to be shaped by a constitutional tradition that places ultimate authority firmly at the centre. Davies describes this as a form of "devo-centralism" in which responsibilities are devolved but often accompanied by funding controls, national frameworks, statutory obligations and accountability mechanisms that preserve Whitehall's dominance.
The timing of this discussion could hardly be more important. England is undergoing one of the most significant periods of governance reform in recent history. Strategic authorities are expanding, metro mayors are assuming greater prominence, councils face mounting fiscal pressures, and demand for public services continues to rise while expectations of local leadership have never been higher. Against this backdrop, the Government's commitment to further devolution has raised expectations about a new settlement between central and local government. The language of "constitutional autonomy" has entered policy discussions, but significant questions remain about whether current reforms genuinely redistribute power or simply reorganise existing structures. Davies argues that meaningful constitutional recognition cannot simply be about creating new institutions. It must address deeper questions around finance, accountability, competence and democratic legitimacy. Without these foundations, constitutional language risks becoming symbolic rather than transformational.
One of the strongest themes emerging from the conversation is the link between autonomy and financial sustainability. The paper highlights the significant reduction in local government spending power over recent years and the growing pressures resulting from adult social care, children's services, homelessness responsibilities and SEND provision. These statutory services increasingly dominate local budgets, leaving less room for wider place-shaping activity. This creates a difficult constitutional question: can local government ever be genuinely autonomous if it remains financially dependent on Whitehall? Davies argues that constitutional reform and fiscal reform must go hand in hand. Meaningful autonomy requires both powers and resources. Constitutional protection without financial resilience risks creating little more than a constitutional shell around ongoing dependency.
The discussion also explores how constitutional evolution has developed elsewhere within the United Kingdom. Scotland provides perhaps the clearest example of how constitutional weight can accumulate over time. Through legislation, convention and political practice, Scottish institutions have acquired a degree of permanence and political legitimacy that significantly increases the costs of central government intervention. Importantly, Davies is not arguing that local government can ever be completely insulated from future reform within the UK's parliamentary system. Rather, the objective is to increase the political, economic and democratic costs of arbitrary recentralisation. Constitutional recognition becomes less about absolute protection and more about creating a more balanced and stable relationship between local and national government.
This debate has become even more relevant in light of the growing influence of metro mayors, particularly Andy Burnham, whose leadership has increasingly shaped national conversations about devolution, local autonomy and the future governance of England. Davies points to Burnham's challenge to central government during the Covid-19 pandemic as a powerful illustration of a local leader asserting democratic authority against Whitehall. Although the immediate dispute did not end in Greater Manchester's favour, the episode significantly raised the profile of both the mayoralty and the wider devolution agenda.
More recently, Burnham's vision for deeper devolution, greater local powers and stronger city-regional leadership has further fuelled debate about whether England is gradually moving towards a more federal-style approach to governance. What makes this significant is that constitutional evolution often follows political reality. Institutions gain constitutional significance when they accumulate public legitimacy, exercise meaningful powers and become difficult for central government to ignore. That process may already be underway. As mayors become more visible, secure stronger electoral mandates and assume greater responsibility for housing, transport, skills, economic development and public service reform, pressure will inevitably grow for stronger constitutional protections. If local leaders are expected to make long-term decisions about the future of their places, investors, businesses and communities will increasingly seek certainty that devolved powers and institutions cannot simply be altered whenever a government changes in Westminster.
The significance of this extends far beyond metro mayors. Davies argues that any meaningful constitutional settlement must encompass the whole architecture of local government, not simply its most prominent figures. District councils, unitary authorities, parish councils and community institutions all play a vital role in local democracy and civic life. There is a danger that constitutional reform becomes focused on a handful of high-profile regional leaders while overlooking the wider democratic infrastructure that connects residents to decision-making. This challenge becomes particularly relevant as local government reorganisation progresses across England, creating larger authorities that may improve efficiency but could weaken longstanding civic identities and local accountability.
One of the most compelling aspects of Davies' argument is his emphasis on political culture as much as constitutional law. Constitutions do not derive their strength solely from legislation. They derive it from democratic practice, public legitimacy and institutions that are confident enough to exercise their powers. Rights become meaningful when they are regularly used, defended and valued by the communities they serve. This places a responsibility on local leaders themselves. If local government seeks stronger constitutional recognition, it must actively demonstrate why local democratic decision-making matters, deliver visible outcomes for communities and challenge unnecessary central interference where appropriate.
The timing of this debate is particularly striking because it coincides with a moment when English local government is arguably being asked to shoulder more responsibility than ever before. From economic growth and housing delivery to social care, net zero, public health and community wellbeing, local leadership is increasingly expected to solve complex and interconnected challenges. Yet the constitutional foundations supporting that responsibility remain uncertain. Local government is being asked to think strategically, act boldly and deliver transformational change while often operating within a framework that can still be reshaped by central government.
What emerges from this conversation is that constitutional recognition is not really about legal protections alone. It is about trust. It is about whether local communities can shape their own futures. It is about whether local democracy is seen as an integral part of the state or merely an administrative arm of central government. Most importantly, it is about whether England is prepared to match its ambitions for devolution with the institutional and constitutional safeguards necessary to sustain it.
As England moves through another era of devolution, reorganisation and public service reform, the question is no longer whether local government matters. The events of recent years have firmly established that it does. The real question is whether local government will continue to remain vulnerable to the changing priorities of successive governments, or whether the country is finally prepared to establish a more enduring settlement that recognises local democracy as a permanent and valued part of its constitutional architecture.
That is the challenge posed by Professor Jonathan Davies, and it is ultimately why this debate matters far beyond constitutional scholars and policy experts. The future of devolution, the success of local leadership and the ability of communities to determine their own destinies may depend on the answer.
